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Memory and Authenticity 
Randolph Starn 
University of California-Berkeley 
Ten years ago Natalie Davis and I decided to put together a 
special issue of Representations we would call "Memory and 
Counter-Memory." When the issue appeared in the spring of 1989, 
the click of discovery, the buzz of current interest, the echo of old 
debates were becoming a roar; by the spring of 1993 when Stephen 
Greenblatt and I offered a Berkeley graduate seminar on "Pasts in 
the Present and the Institutionalizations of Memory," we were part 
of a movement questioning proprietary claims over the past by his- 
tory and historians. Only a few years later the movement has be- 
come an industry, with an extensive product line and, so we might 
think, some worries about overproduction. Such is the short aca- 
demic life-cycle at this fin de siecle, R to D, glimmer to glut. 
The quick pace makes it easy to forget that the historical study 
of collective memory is already in its second or third generation, or 
even older, depending how the reckoning is done. Just to take French 
examples one could start, say, with the work of Maurice Halbwachs, 
then go on to the collective effort of Pierre Nora and his collabora- 
tors, before arriving at a current cluster of studies of remembering 
and forgetting Vichy and the Algerian war. Ian Hacking has recently 
argued that French positivist sciences of psychology began a "re- 
writing of the soul" in terms of memory in the 1870s, and Richard 
Terdiman has located a consciousness-raising crisis of memory in 
France much earlier in the nineteenth century. One way or another, a 
rich corpus of histories of memory exists from which we may draw 
some conclusions before rushing on, as it may be, like lemmings.' 
Here is a sample list of basic propositions that seem to me es- 
tablished or reconfirmed by the memory literature I have read off 
and on over several years: 1
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As in a classic, Aristotelian distinction, memory (mneme) is in- 
voluntary, memory that comes up unbidden, or a deliberate act of 
recollection (anamnesis); although recent historical studies tend to 
blur the distinction, as the ancients also did, they are mostly con- 
cerned with memory of the selective sort. 
Individual memory may be of both kinds, but collective memory 
is always constructed because, absent an ether of transcendental, 
organic, or communal memory, people can't remember things they 
haven't experienced. 
Therefore, collective memory has no unmediated access to the 
past but is about the articulation of identity from the vantage of the 
present; it is continuously reconstructed rather than recalled pris- 
tine, and it attributes the causes and truths of things that it claims to 
know. 
Collective memory can best be characterized as a practice or a 
set of practices rather than a faculty or an entity such as-these are 
common suggestions-a storage bin, an aviary, a wax tablet, or a 
palimpsest.' 
To clinch these points could take whole tomes. But considering that 
I am fairly confident about being able to make the case, why can I 
also be certain of resistance and feel it in myself besides? There's 
evidently more to this feeling than my having listed propositions 
without making arguments. Even Ockham's razor needs whetting by 
argumentation, but the objections that come to mind go beyond 
reasonable arguments. To begin with, I suspect that many people, 
including perfectly respectable academics, want to obfuscate be- 
cause memory proffers relief from humdrum history, a promise of 
intimacy, access to "lived experience," critiques of official compla- 
cency or duplicity, and at the same time an imagined universality 
that transcends everyday routines. This is nothing new, of course. 
Nineteenth-century historicism wanted to recall the past into the 
present; "living memory" was in all senses of the word a "medium" 
of time travel, and there were and still are many frequent flyers. My 
guess is that not even the most determined postmodernist sensibil- 
ity can altogether resist this magic carpet. 
If anything, programmatic postmodernist opposition to such 
flights may have something to do with some kinds of objections I'm 
anticipating. It is, for example, textbook Deconstruction that a posi- 
tive claim hinges on some more or less encrypted Other, and this 
means that deconstructed versions of memory will call up, ironically 
or not, shadowy versions that are allegedly organic, unmediated, 
whole, present, etc. But there are more pressing reasons for wanting 2




to insist that the immediacy of memory matters. Insofar as twenti- 
eth-century traumas and horrors, to which the critical dismantling of 
conventional knowledge is partly a response, lie beyond the limits 
of representation, they have come to demarcate an auratic realm of 
remembering and forgetting.' Add to this some usual suspects of 
modern malaise-capitalism and commodification, depersonalization 
and homogenization, mass media and mass culture-and we have 
the incentive or desire for alternatives to which memory corresponds 
and caters. Even irreverent critiques of the truth-claims of memory 
often have an elegiac quality about them, not exactly nostalgic per- 
haps for any particular remembered tradition so much as for the 
ability to believe in tradition at all. 
At this point I want to shift to memory's Siamese twin, which is 
not (for present purposes anyway) forgetting or silence or history 
but authenticity. I want to do so because the notional careers of 
memory and authenticity overlap so closely as to be practically in- 
separable. Lionel Trilling's account of the notion of authenticity 
since Rousseau in a celebrated series of Harvard lectures could just 
as well apply to parallel conceptions of memory. So, for example: 
At the behest of the criterion of authenticity, much that was 
once thought to make up the very fabric of culture has come to 
seem of little account, mere fantasy or ritual, or downright falsi- 
fication. Conversely, much that culture traditionally condemned 
and sought to exclude is accorded a considerable moral author- 
ity by reason of the authenticity claimed for it, for example, 
disorder, violence, and unreason . . . [A] marvelous generative 
force [is] assigned to authenticity, which implies the downward 
movement through all the cultural superstructures to someplace 
where all movement ends, and begins. (Trilling 100) 
Trilling went on to quote Wordsworth: "Points have we within all 
our souls / Where all stand single" (105). He could have updated 
these lines with the existentialists' inauthenticity as an alleged loss 
of this focus and its dissipation in the "average everyday" of mind- 
less occupations and mass culture. In any case, memory understood 
as individualized and circumscribed, whether by a person or a spe- 
cial group, would be authenticity's analogue. It would bear authen- 
tic testimony against distortion or dilution or excision by institu- 
tional orthodoxy. 
Like memory holding forth on its purity, authenticity in this 
sense is an easy target. I have a bulging file of authenticity jokes. 3
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Adorno mocked an existentialist jargon of authenticity as "the 
Wurlitzer organ of the spirit" (17). In Umberto Eco's travels in 
hyperreality, paying customers at Forest Lawns cemetery are told 
that the stained glass "Last Supper" is more authentic than 
Leonardo's original. According to one of the greatest students of 
pop culture, Sam Goldwyn, "Authenticity is everything; if you can 
fake it, you've got it made" (Orvell 12). A review article on the recent 
Jane Austen film fad begins with a mind-boggling headline: "In the 
Authenticity Game, Only a Few Win."' The catch is that, like memory 
again, authenticity never seems to lose altogether; it's a bottom line 
that is very hard to erase. David Lowenthal, the Sisyphus of a long 
campaign against what he calls our "mania" for authenticity, is a 
case in point. "In place of ignorance or philistinism," Lowenthal 
wrote more than fifteen years ago, "we are now so besotted by the 
past that anything goes so long as it is 'authentic.' In what purports 
to be history . . . 'authenticity' means fidelity to feeling that swamps 
facts in anachronistic invention; a search for roots so engage as to 
include very little of the actual past" (The Past 231). But no sooner 
has Lowenthal got uphill on faking in art and architecture than "false 
authenticity and inauthentic truth" slip past him in musical perfor- 
mances, ethnic cookery, airport art, identity politics, clothing labels, 
and The Lowenthal Album, "a leather textured library edition . . . 
registered in the owner's name, serially numbered, and accompanied 
with a Certificate of Authenticity" ("Art and Authenticity" 646). In 
his most recent book Lowenthal fights the same uphill battle all over 
again. 
In effect, strict conceptions of memory and authenticity make it 
difficult if not impossible to take one or the other seriously. But this 
is to be, so to speak, immemorious about both authenticity and 
memory. The strict constructions are, after all, historically shallow 
and short. For authenticity they arise somewhere between the late 
eighteenth-century question "Born Originals, how comes it to pass 
that we die Copies?" and various versions of a fall from some pris- 
tine state of nature and condition of the soul.' The fixation on memory 
as a key to individual and social identity comes later, as I have noted 
in citing Hacking and Terdiman on the French case. In this century 
Halbwachs's influential analysis of "les cadres sociaux" 'the social 
framework' within which memory hinges on "the support of a group 
delimited in space and time" was actually part of an argument for the 
moderating accountability of history. Even the widespread misread- 
ing of his work as a celebration of collective memory was delayed by 4




the war and his death at the hands of the Nazis.6 I'm not impressed 
by longue duree versions of the preeminence of memory, from Au- 
gustine or even Hesiod, because they are too generic to make spe- 
cific historical sense.' 
Before the later eighteenth century, memory was often con- 
ceived and used as a matter of teachable rules and routines. Today's 
advertisements on "building your memory and empowering your 
life" offer much the same instruction. There is nothing particularly 
mysterious or self-enclosing about the old arts of memory as we 
have come to understand them, thanks to Frances Yates, first of all, 
and now to Mary Carruthers and Lina Bolzoni.8 Even so, studies of 
pre-modern mnemonics have been only glancingly integrated and 
absorbed in accounts of modern memory. Pierre Nora, for instance, 
after acknowledging Frances Yates for his borrowed notion of "lieux 
de memoire," proceeds as if the terminology were new and deploys 
it only for what he regards as the emptied-out "memory places" of 
our time. But these are not at all like the full topoi or loci of the 
ancient, medieval, and Renaissance arts of memory, where memory 
worked in and through physical sites generating references that 
could be variously assembled and taken apart in making an oration 
or a text. It is misleading to say, as Hacking does dismissively, that 
"the whole point is to provide instant recall of any body of desired 
facts, things, or texts" like a computer (Hacking 202). The ars 
memorativa was an art of invention, both in the old sense of coming 
on or into something (invenire) and in the sense of discovering 
something new. 
The old art of memory does not entail the kind of nostalgic 
essentialism that affirms the reality of an origin by proclaiming its 
loss. Yates was especially concerned with memory images, arranged 
as in "theaters" of memory and, in hermetic traditions, capable of 
figuring the harmonies between earthly and transcendental spheres. 
Carruthers sees memory as nothing less than a master modality of 
medieval culture. While she shows it encompassing everything from 
heraldic devices to illuminated manuscripts, stained-glass windows, 
and church gargoyles, she insists that writing was not at odds with 
or detached from the mnemonic imaging. Medieval mnemonics did 
not distinguish "between writing on the memory and writing on 
some other surface"; rather than being an external support or imple- 
ment of memory, the activity of writing was a kind of memorization 
itself, or at least intimately bound up with it. So, on the one hand, 
"the symbolic representations we call writing are no more than cues 5
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or triggers for the memorial 'representations'. . . upon which human 
cognition is based"; on the other hand, "anything that encodes 
information in order to stimulate the memory to store or retrieve 
information is 'writing,' whether it be alphabet, hieroglyph, ideo- 
gram, American Indian picture-writing, or Inca knot-writing" 
(Carruthers 31-32). 
As might be expected by now, there were parallels in older theo- 
ries and practices of authentication. Whereas we are likely to regard 
something as authentic insofar as it is categorically unique and self- 
referential and ipso facto irreproducible, authenticity in an older 
sense, and in many non-Western cultures, is produced by attesta- 
tion, the witness of tradition, the appeal to assent. Authentication 
in this sense is a process, a function of discussion and evaluation, 
neither merely subjective nor conclusive once and for all. 
I'm not sure how plausible this sounds. It will not inspire confi- 
dence that there are especially good examples in the canon law on 
the authentication of relics and saints' lives. The procedures in- 
clude assembling documents, lists, charters, and monuments of 
whatever kind capable of throwing light on the relics or lives in 
question; their examination by what we would call expert witnesses, 
deliberation on the case, including the arguments of the Devil's 
Advocate; the achievement of a degree of probability consistent 
with good conscience and moral conviction about the outcome. If 
contrary facts emerge, then the veracity of relic may be bracketed, 
though it may continue to enjoy the respect to which past usage 
entitles it.' In the view of perhaps the greatest of all Catholic au- 
thenticators, "it is not authority that makes for authenticity, it is 
authenticity that makes authority in virtue of a conception accord- 
ing to which authority is never but a matter of assessed witness- 
ing." It is "une persuasion et conversation commune que l' on a de 
quelques faits. . . ." 'an opinion and shared conversation that one 
has about some facts' (Mabillon 162). This is from the Benedictine 
Jean Mabillon, who is commemorated next to Descartes in the 
Pantheon, no doubt to the surprise of both had they known about it. 
Another example is more familiar, though not necessarily better 
understood. I'm thinking of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in 
Anglo-American law. Without reading Barbara Shapiro and other 
legal historians, we might take it for granted that reasonable doubt 
refers to doubts of reason by standards of demonstrative and logi- 
cal certainty. Such are the standards toward which post-Cartesians 
are drawn, despite real experience and better judgment. The point is 6




that human affairs are actually too complicated and uncertain for 
such demonstrations, and too morally fraught besides to be treated 
like geometry or physical science. Together with the need for local 
knowledge, this is, among other reasons, why Common Law man- 
dates juries. In one classic formulation, "reasonable doubt" is 
not merely possible doubt; because everything relating to hu- 
man affairs . . . is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is 
that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and 
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the mind . . . in that 
condition that the jurors cannot say they feel an abiding con- 
viction of moral certainty of the truth of the charge . . . [that] the 
evidence establishes the truth of the facts with a reasonable 
and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the 
understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment. . . . 
(Shapiro 24-25) 
The judgment of conscience was not understood to be merely will- 
ful or prescribed by custom. It was supposed to be a rational deci- 
sion, linked to the understanding and not just to the passions. Con- 
science had high commission and authority because its delibera- 
tions mattered more than abstract reason or physical science. Hence 
the "common rule of authentic evidence" formulated at least by the 
late seventeenth century was a cat's cradle of criteria at once prag- 
matic and fairly precise. It called for examining "the nature of the 
evidence within common fame, tradition, and the writings of per- 
sons who related them, together with the number, concurrence, ve- 
racity and private characters of those persons . . so that [without 
actually being eyewitnesses] they were bound by all the rules of 
historical faith, and right reason, to give credit to this [or that] his- 
tory" (Shapiro 11). 
Now my sketchy account will hardly convince anyone "beyond 
a reasonable doubt" or otherwise. But it may be enough to suggest 
ways out of the impasse of treating memory and authenticity so 
narrowly that we are obliged either to turn cynical or to give up on 
them altogether. These involve process, solicit varieties of evidence, 
call for public and professional accountability. They entered the 
historian's tool kit long ago under the old-fashioned title "historical 
erudition" with quaint subtitles such as philology, diplomatic, and 
codicology. Perhaps this is the fantasy of an early modern historian, 
but it seems to me that the old grudits have something to show us 
still.' Having already made a "linguistic turn," they could insist on 7
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close reading and definition, while also taking it for granted that 
language generated copious meanings that had to be interpreted 
and contextualized. They were not, for all that, soft on reality, among 
other reasons, because they also worked with marks, shards, and 
traces as indices of distant pasts. They did not have easy lumping 
words such as "culture," society," "experience," or, as Ian Hacking 
thinks he has shown, "memory" to fudge the differences. They were 
interdisciplinary besides: having relatively little evidence, they had 
to use whatever material or method came to hand. Again avant la 
lettre, they were "dialogic" and "self-reflexive," as Professor La Capra 
would want the up-to-date historian to be, because their work was a 
conversation among contending citations and the citizens of the 
respublica literarum. The texts they wrote did not ride high over 
the ballast of footnotes but were interrogated and open to interpel- 
lation in the work and play of cross-referencing, digression, excursus, 
and quotation. 
It's tempting to conclude with the postmodern mantra "back to 
the future." But I don't believe that's ever possible or, even if it 
were, necessary. After all, the kinds of attention and the skills I've 
dwelt upon have not been repressed awaiting a return so much as 
marginalized, literally so when consigned to the sidelines as prelimi- 
nary and propadeutic or relegated to our footnotes or, more likely in 
the current publishing economy, endnotes. My proposal, in the end, 
is a modest one: that historians and other students of history and 
memory bring to the front and center the critical erudition of assess- 
ment, research, and accountability that lie on the sides and bottom 
of our work. 
Notes 
1. For France and a very large literature, I limit myself to citing: Pierre 
Nora, Les lieux de memoire; Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple 
Personality and the Sciences of Memory, 198-209; Richard Terdiman, Present 
Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis. The most important surveys in- 
clude Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of 
Tradition in American Culture; John R. Gillis, Commemorations: The Poli- 
tics of National Identity (Princeton, 1994); Raphael Samuel, Theatres of 
Memory, vol. 1: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture ; and David 
Lowenthal's two books, The Past is a Foreign Country and Possessed by 
the Past: The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History. 8




2. See Roediger. 
3. See Friedlander. 
4. New York Times, Sunday, March 13, 1996, H-15. 
5. See, for instance, Marshall Berman, Rousseau and the Politics of Authen- 
ticity and All That's Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of the Modern. 
6. See Halbwachs 84. 
7. See Hutton. 
8. See Yates, The Art of Memory; Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: 
A Study in Medieval Culture; Lina Bolzoni, La stanza della memoria: modelli 
letterari e iconografici nell'eta della stampa. 
9. See Dooley. 
10. I develop this view in the introduction to The New Erudition, 1-12. 
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